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Laval théologique et philosophique, 41,1 (février 1985) 
THE CONCEPT OF « SOUL » IN THE 
JESUIT RELATIONS : WHERE THERE ANY 
PHILOSOPHERS AMONG THE NORTH 
AMERICAN INDIANS ? 
Michael POMEDLI 
RÉSUMÉ. — Dans cet article, je tente de relater, de comprendre et de mettre en valeur 
la philosophie des Indiens d'Amérique du Nord au sujet de la conception de « l'âme » 
telle qu'on la découvre dans les Relations des Jésuites, 1610-1791. 
SUMMARY. — In this paper I try to recount, understand and become engaged in the 
philosophy of the North American Indians on the conception of the «soul» as 
found in The Jesuit Relations, 1610-1791. 
INTRODUCTION 
SOME PROBLEMS present themselves immediately. The Jesuits indicate that there was scarcely any philosophy or philosophizing present among the natives. The na-
tives, the Jesuits noted, embodied an almost exclusively experiential approach to life. 
A parallel might be Kosuke Koyama's account in Waterbuffalo Theology2. Koyama 
uses his own imagery in his sermons to Thais who spend most of their time with 
waterbuffaloes in the rice fields. Can such an experiential, waterbuffalo or peace-pipe 
approach qualify as « philosophy » ? The Jesuit missionary, Paul Le Jeune, thinks 
not. He notes that if the Hurons did any philosophy it was with their feet and not 
1. Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, travels and explorations of the Jesuit missionaries in New 
France, ed. by Reuben Gold Thwaites, New York : Pageant, 1959. Future references are by volume 
and page. Although the explorer and trader were the first Europeans in New France, they were seldom 
great letter writers. The letter writers par excellence were the Jesuit missionaries. In fact, letter writing 
was for them a religious duty ! Annually, they sent a written report of their activities to their superior 
in Quebec or Montreal. The superior, in turn, edited a narrative {relation) of the most important 
events in the various missionary districts and forwarded these to his provincial superior in France. 
These narratives were then published as The Jesuit Relations. See 1:37-38. 
2. New York: Maryknoll, 1974. 
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with their heads (8 : 271 ; 10 : 147) ! Did they do any « head » philosophizing at all in 
their considerations of the soul? 
A second problem is epistemological and hermeneutical. How could the Jesuits, 
schooled in European scholastic thought, understand and transmit the obviously 
different Indian culture? How could they not impose procrustean determinations? 
The concept, «soul», for instance, is in 17th century philosophical and theological 
circles quite refined and specialized. To what extent do European concepts of soul 
reflect the natives' oral cultural sphere? Are the Jesuits' literal and the Indians' oral 
spheres of culture mutually exclusive? If they are not, how can we interpret/adapt 
one sphere into another? Also, did the Jesuit reporters in New France and the 
revisers and adapters in Old France employ a style and content of writing that would 
satisfy primarily European curiosities? 
While recognizing the importance of the second problem, the epistemological 
and hermeneutical, I will focus primarily on the first, the more philosophical. 
1. General Conceptions about Souls 
In defense of the Jesuits, the Relations, which are among the earliest documents 
we have of the native people, display genuine attempts to understand the natives' 
ways of life and language. Such an understanding did not come easily, for as they 
note, the Indians had a disturbing tendency to live with contradictions and failed to 
elucidate perplexities (10: 143). We might accuse them, nevertheless, of using their 
own cultural attainments as mesuring sticks for native thought. 
1.1. Many names for the soul. The very concept, « soul », might be considered a 
case of inaccurate measurement. Although the natives' nuanced names for soul did 
not correspond exactly with the European concept, there are similarities. Their 
names for the soul are : 
1.1.1. One name, khiondhecwi, insofar as it merely animates the body and gives 
it life ; 
1.1.2. Another name, oki andaerandi, insofar as the soul possesses reason; 
1.1.3. The soul as thinking and deliberating — endionrra ; 
1.1.4. The affective or desiring soul — gonennoncwal ; 
1.1.5. A kind of free-soul, esken, which is separated from the body at death but 
remains for some time ; 
1.1.6. The soul that remains with the body, with the bones, after the person has 
died (10: 141). 
These different conceptions of the soul reflect the functions of the living person 
and his internal and external experiences. 
1.2. Other general characteristics of souls include their divisibility and reason-
ableness («raisonnable») (10:287), and their spirituality and immateriality (26: 
125-127). 
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Another general characteristic falls under the western term «animism». Le 
Jeune wrote of the Montagnais that they believed « all things... are endowed with 
souls » (6 : 175)3. There is a ranking of souls, however, a difference of the human soul 
from that of animals (26: 125). 
1.2.2. Materiality and immortality of the souls. Le Jeune does not give the 
natives any credit for any spiritual conception of the soul : « (Indians), never having 
heard of anything purely spiritual... they imagine the souls as shadows of animate 
objects... they represent the soul of man as a dark and sombre image, or as a shadow 
of the man himself» and attribute to it all the parts of the human body. In fact, they 
believe that the souls eat and drink (6:175) and have the same needs as bodies (8 :23). 
Again, it was disconcerting to the missionaries that the natives did not face the 
illogical consequences of the material conception of the soul, the Jesuits felt, even 
when the absurd consequences were pointed out. If souls continued to exist 
physically, Le Jeune argued, the world would soon be overpopulated (12:29, 31) ! In 
addition, this very physical determination of souls led Le Jeune to judge that the 
Montagnais and Algonquins did not believe in souls at all (16:191). 
2. Origin of the Conception of Soul 
We have no immediate data about the way the native people in question in the 
Relations arrived at a conception of soul. From the scant material available, it is 
possible, however, to theorize about it. According to Edward Tylor4, natives' belief 
in the soul may be traced to two sources : 
1) Observations of the difference between active individuals and the dead, 
seriously ill, or sleeping persons ; 
2) Experiences during twilight states of various kinds. 
In the first observation, the individual can conclude that there is some sort of 
life-consciousness principle present in the living and absent in the dead. In the second 
experience, the individual can conclude that the soul is a transient shadowy being, 
overflowing the being's rootedness in time and space. 
3. Duality of Souls 
The many general conceptions of souls seem to coalesce into two main views, 
that of the separable or free-soul, on the one hand, and that of the body or life-soul, 
on the other : «... many think we have two souls, both of them being divisible and 
3. Claude Allouez notes of the Ottawa Indians : « They believe, moreover, that the souls of the Departed 
govern the fishes in the Lake ; and thus, from the earliest times, they have held the immortality, and 
even the metempsychosis, of the souls of the dead fishes, believing that they pass into other fishes' 
bodies. Therefore they never throw their bones into the fire, for fear that they may offend these souls, 
so that they will cease to come into their nets» (50:289). 
4. Primitive Culture : Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and 
Custom, London : 1871, chapter XI, as noted in Ake HULTKRANTZ, Conceptions of the Soul among 
North American Indians, Stockholm : Caslon, 1953, 19. 
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material, and yet both reasonable ; the one separates itself from the body at death, yet 
remains in the Cemetery until the feast of the Dead, — after which it either changes 
into a Turtledove, or, according to the most common belief, it goes away at once to 
the village of souls. The other is, as it were, bound to the body, and informs, so to 
speak, the corpse ; it remains in the ditch of the dead after the feast, and never leaves 
it, unless one bears it again as a child» (10 : 287). 
Let us examine the descriptors for each one of these souls : 
3.1. The body-soul. The body-soul is perceptive (39 : 19). Humans have this soul 
in common with animals (42:51); «dogs, deer, fish and other animals have... 
immortal and reasonable souls» (8: 121). For the Onondaga, the body-soul is the 
seat for violent emotions such as sadness and anger (42: 51). While this soul has a 
localized existence in the bones, upon death at least, it may slip somewhat 
accidentally into the fetus of a pregnant woman who passes by (1:263). 
The body-soul operates in connection with the body and its organs. It is active 
when the body is active or awake. Its existence is tenuous upon death. 
3.2. The free-soul. The free-soul is rational and can achieve an independence 
from the body in several ways ; in dreams ; on the occasion of violent passions arising 
from the body soul ; while displaying a leadership or erratic tendency ; upon death. 
Let us briefly examine how the free-soul achieves some measure of independence : 
3.2.1. In dreams. Paul Ragueneau wrote of the Huron mission : « When, during 
sleep, we dream of something that is far away, they think the soul issues forth from 
the body and proceeds to the place where those objects are that are pictured to it 
during that time» (33 :19). 
3.2.2. On the occasion of violent passions arising from the body-soul. Violent 
passions such as acute sadness or anger can expel the rational soul from the body. A 
present is then made to restore the free-soul to the body again (42 :51). 
3.2.3. While displaying a leadership or erratic tendency. The free-soul has an 
erratic, an escapist tendency or the tendency to lead the body along. Le Jeune told the 
story of a woman who had been captured. Her soul escaped first and « she ran after it 
so as not to let it escape (by itself)» (11:117). 
3.3.4. Upon death. At death the free-soul moves far away, going on foot (whose 
feet?), fording streams, etc. (6: 177-179). 
The free-soul displays a leadership role over the body, and over the body-soul. 
The free-soul is experienced expressly in twilight times, in dreams, when the body is 
in a passive state. It seems that a person's individuality can spill beyond the confines 
of his body, extending his range of « experiences »5. 
The nature of the free-soul is disclosed through its desires which Ragueneau 
describes as « inborn {desideria innata) and concealed » (33 : 189). These « come from 
the depths of the soul not through any knowledge, but by means of a certain blind 
5. See Lucien Levy-Bruhl's rather elusive notion of participation in The Notebooks on Primitive 
Mentality, Oxford : Blackwell, 1975, 79-80. 
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transporting of the soul to certain objects» (33:189). The free-soul makes these 
hidden desires known through dreams « which are its language» (33 :189). « Accor-
dingly, when these desires are accomplished, it is satisfied ; but, on the contrary, if it 
be not granted what it desires, it becomes angry, and not only does not give its body 
the good and the happiness that it wished to procure for it, but often it also revolts 
against the body, causing various diseases, and even death» (33 :189). 
The pre-eminence and power of the free-soul is evident here, a power to ensure a 
wholesome existence for the body-person and a power to destroy it. Health, then, is 
not just an external matter, ensuring proper nutrition, for example, but a discernment 
of the depths of the soul, an interpretation of the free-soul's desires disclosed through 
dream images. 
4. Spirituality, Immateriality of the Soul 
While James Buteux was giving religious instruction at Tadoussac on the 
immortality of the soul, a native person responded : « Why dost thou take the trouble 
of proving that to us ? One would be very foolish to doubt it. We see very well that 
our soul is different from that of a dog ; the latter can perceive nothing except 
through the eyes and ears, and knows nothing that does not come under its senses. 
But the soul of man knows many things that are not perceived by the senses ; and so it 
can act without the body, and without the senses. And if it can act without the body, 
it can exist without the body. Therefore, it is not material and consequently it is 
immortal» (26: 125-127). 
The Tadoussac Indian's reasoning is clear, at least in this heavily Aristotelian 
and syllogistic form ascribed to it by Buteux. In view of the physical characteristics 
of the soul noted above, however, we are hesitant to conclude from a person's 
immanent activity to the immortality of the soul. Some of the corporeal images of the 
soul can, nevertheless, be viewed as pointing in the direction of its gradual 
spiritualization. The movement toward some ethereal characteristics can be seen in 
the descriptions of the soul as a shadow, as a dark and sombre image, for instance. 
To push the spiritualization even further, immanent activities such as desiring, 
thinking, deliberating, and also engaging in free movement and having an invisible 
presence are ascribed to the soul. 
Despite this movement to the soul's immortality and immateriality, the Jesuits 
confessed that they had «all the difficulty in the world» (10:141) in getting the 
natives to believe in the principle of the one soul. And even after the missionaries 
made repeated attempts at proselytizing and exposing their « false beliefs» (10:147), 
the natives often continued to believe as formerly (8:23). Natives were accused of 
being somewhat simpleminded in not looking for more profound causes and 
resolving contradictions (33 :191). 
Obviously, the Indians were not philosophers in the European sense. There is 
more here, however, than a mere listing of experiences related to the soul, as noted in 
the following instances : the manifestation of hidden desires through dreams ; the 
movement toward ethereal dimensions of the soul ; the positing and justification for 
the spirituality and immateriality of the soul. 
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5. Understanding both the Materiality and Spirituality of the Souls 
Is it possible to understand the seeming contradiction that the soul is at one and 
the same time both material and spiritual? 
Let us approach the material-spiritual juxtaposition of the soul from two 
perspectives : 1) The individual as living ; 2) The individual as dead. 
5.1. How can we reconcile both the materiality and spirituality of both the body-
soul and the free-soul when the individual is living ? 
It is relatively easy to understand the role of the body-soul as a spiritual principle 
animating, forming, making actual and keeping the body in act. It is akin to the 
principle of formal causality in Fragment 42 from Aristotle's lost dialogue, Eudemus6. 
In De anima, Aristotle notes that « the soul must be a substance in the sense of the 
form of a natural body having life potentially within it» (412al9-21)7. The very 
nature of the soul is to inform and constitute a body. An existence separate from the 
body would be unnatural and impossible for the soul. 
How are we to understand the materiality of the body-soul ? Is it an « incoherent 
and general» (3:135) conception as the Relations alleges? In an experiential 
perspective, the exclusively material conception of the soul might be downplayed for 
the organism gives evidence of a dynamism. However, to the extent that one observes 
a living body one would still speak in material terms much as Hebrew thought 
encapsules both the corporeality of humans and the life substance in one term, 
basar%. 
What can we make of the free-soul as both spiritual and material? The Indians' 
foot-loose and fancy-free conception of the free-soul does nothing to stabilize the 
conception of individuality. Individuality cannot be established by a soul that can 
roam about almost at will. What is the nature of this independent willing? What kind 
of unity and stability is possible with such a conception? Perhaps the North 
American Indian is trying to show the ideal and expansive reaches of the soul. Then, 
with Jamake High water in The Primal Mind9 we are able to answer the question, 
Where are we when we are thinking or dreaming? Is it also possible, with Teilhard de 
Chardin, to point to the unlimited dimensions of a more spiritualized view of human 
beings, in terms of a sixth sense, in terms of extra-sensory perception ?10 
6. 1482b36-38 as noted in Joseph OWENS, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy, New York : 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959,319. Here, as in the other Aristotelian Dialogues, a « Platonic» theory 
of soul has given rise to Werner Jaeger's developmental theory of Aristotle's thought. The theory in 
Eudemus is quite incompatible with the one proposed in Aristotle's De anima. See JAEGER, Aristotle, 
Fundamentals of the History of his Development, London : Oxford, 1934. 
7. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, New York : Random, 1941. De anima, .2,1 ; 412a 
27-28 and 412b 4-6. 
8. J.A.T. ROBINSON, The Body, London: SCM, 1963, 13. 
9. The Primal Mind, vision and reality in Indian America, New York : New American Library, 1981, 89. 
10. Pierre TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, The Divine Milieu, London : Collins, 1957, 143-144 : « The innumerable 
partial worlds which envelop the diverse human monads press in upon him from all around His task 
is to re-kindle his own ardour by contact with the ardour of all these foci, to make his own sap 
communicate with that circulating in the other cells, to receive or propagate movement and life for the 
common benefit, and to adapt himself to the common temperature and tension. To what power is it 
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Again, the kinship of the free-soul to another dimension of Aristotle's conception 
of the soul is apparent. In the Eudemus, he « is reported as teaching that life apart 
from the body is natural to souls, like health, while life in the body is unnatural, 
contrary to nature, like disease. » n 
We have in Aristotle, as in native thought, the tension of two conceptions of the 
soul, indeed of two or more souls 12. We have the soul as naturally separable from the 
body (the free-soul), and the soul as naturally (substantially) united to the body (the 
body-soul). 
It might be a temptation to dismiss the retention of both the materiality and 
spirituality of the two souls as the fumblings of primitive pre-philosophical minds 
were it not for a kindred position in the First Philosopher ! These cross-cultural 
depictions of the soul underscore the dual tendencies in each human being. While we 
might affirm ourselves, on the one hand, as integral, as one, in our actions and 
thoughts, we can experience, on the other hand, the primacy of either the corporeal 
or the intellectual13. 
5.2. Let us consider the dual souls from the perspective of the individual as dead. 
What is the status of the spiritual dimension of the body-soul in death ? Is its 
actuality pared down so that the matter, the corpse, predominates, but the form has 
some power in the body's periphery, informing fetuses, for instance? Is the status of 
the spiritual dimension of the soul akin to the Hebrews' conception of sheol, the 
world of shadows, a vague preliminary abode of the dead and their nature? 14 The 
natives maintain that the material dimension of the body-soul in death is localized in 
the corpse itself. 
What is the spiritual dimension of the free-soul in death? Its commanding, 
independent and innate characteristics have been noted above. 
What about the material dimension of the free-soul? Is this material dimension 
merely a way of speaking about the human reality, the soul, in a continued 
anthropomorphic and rather primitive way? Or does the spiritual dimension prevail 
awaiting some form of reincarnation while the soul maintains a shadowy connection 
with the body, a quasi-material affinity? Or is the free-soul really spiritual, and 
material only insofar as it tends toward a bodily existence, much as in Thomas 
Aquinas' conception of the soul after death, where its existence is not in accordance 
with its nature? 15 
reserved to burst asunder the envelope in which our individual microcosms tend jealously to isolate 
themselves and vegetate?» 
11. Fragment 35, 1480M4-15, in Owens, 318-319. 
12. Basic Works, De anima, 2,2; 413b24-27. 
13. The portrayal of a material, free-soul reflects a penchant of primal people to move to the abstract and 
spiritual only gradually while still retaining and even emphasizing the concrete physical images. See 
Hultkrantz, 33. According to J. G. Frazer, this physical conception of the soul is common among 
primal people. The Golden Bough, London : Macmillan, 1949, 874. 
14. See T. H. GASTER, «Abode of the Dead», The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, New York: 
Abingdon, 1962, 787-788. 
15. Basic Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton Pegis, New York : Random, 1945, Summa theologiae I, 
q. 89, a. 1. 
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We cannot answer conclusively for we do not have enough information. As we 
have already noted, while the free-soul is described in concrete imagery, there is a 
gradual movement toward and predominance of the spiritual dimension. As to the 
possibility of metempsychosis, we have not investigated that aspect in our paper. To 
propose a solution in terms of western European thought, that of Thomas Aquinas in 
this instance, seems to involve imposing a too speculative model on the thought 
available. 
CONCLUSION 
I conclude that the peace-pipe philosophy as penned in The Jesuit Relations is 
genuine philosophy, for the natives held a rather intricate and sophisticated 
conception of the soul. The Jesuits present the natives as doing more than recalling 
their experiences. Natives espouse views, some of which are contradictory for us, but 
which are food for thought both for themselves and for us and are unresolved by 
Aristotle himself!16 Indeed, natives thought not only with their feet but also with 
their heads ! 
Can we know enough about native thinking to give a fair representation and 
appraisal of it ? To what extent do unrecorded myths and legends embody a greater 
depth and understanding of the soul? From reading the Relations alone, our 
procedure must be that of caution, and our conclusions tentative. But I think it is 
possible to move across cultural spheres, distinct as the native oral and the European 
literal are. The credibility for such a crossing are the facts that the missionaries made 
great efforts to understand native lifestyles and language, that they noted teachings 
quite opposed to their own, that they confessed that even after conversion to 
Catholicism, natives lapsed into former patterns of life. In the end, I think the Jesuits 
tried to let native views stand. 
The difficulty in making cross-cultural interpretations might appear to be 
insuperable. If one is overly venturesome, however, the temptation might be to use 
one mold for all. Between the Scylla of impossibility and the Charybdis of 
dominance, the attitude of letting another view emerge without falsifying it is 
possible and commendable. 
16. Was the « intellect that makes all things» and the « intellect that becomes all things» (De anima, 3,4; 
429a 100 m fact « separate» from the structure of the individual person (Averroes, Arts masters 13th 
century Paris) or an essential part of each person and, when « separated» in death from the matter of 
the body, existing in an unnatural way (Aquinas)? 
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